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PRIVACY, SCREENED OUT: ANALYZING 
THE THREAT TO INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY 
RIGHTS AND FIFTH AMENDMENT 
PROTECTIONS IN STATE v. STAHL 
Abstract: Courts across the United States have applied Fifth Amendment pro-
tections to passcodes, as long as those passcodes are not a foregone conclusion. 
In order for a court to determine that a passcode is a forgone conclusion, and 
thus not testimonial in nature, the prosecution must show that they knew the ex-
istence, possession, and authenticity of the evidence that would be discovered 
by the compelled passcode, before the passcode is compelled. The foregone 
conclusion doctrine was established, and had been used, to balance the need of 
law enforcement to gather incriminating evidence while still protecting defend-
ants’ Fifth Amendment rights. In 2016, the Florida Second Court of Appeals 
took the forgone conclusion doctrine to an extreme in State v. Stahl, by expand-
ing the foregone conclusion doctrine and finding that evidence must be signifi-
cantly testimonial in order for it to be protected by the Fifth Amendment. If oth-
er courts follow the Stahl decision, it would mean the end of the balance that the 
foregone conclusion has provided as well as all Fifth Amendment protections to 
encryption. 
INTRODUCTION 
Courts have had to reinterpret Fifth Amendment protections against 
self-incrimination as communication technology has evolved.1 The in-
creased speed of modern decryption technology and the proliferation of 
smartphone usage has left individual courts to interpret an antiquated Su-
preme Court doctrine.2 Today, individuals are increasingly reliant upon their 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Matthew J. Weber, Note, Warning—Weak Password: The Courts’ Indecipherable Ap-
proach to Encryption and the Fifth Amendment, 2016 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 455, 456–57 
(stating that as cell phones, computers, and the internet have become entwined in every aspect of 
daily life, courts have had to interpret what technological communications are protected by the 
Fifth Amendment); see also U.S. CONST. amend. X (stating that “[n]o person . . . shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be witness against himself”); Erin Sales, Note, The “Biometric Rev-
olution”: An Erosion of the Fifth Amendment Privilege to Be Free from Self-Incrimination, 69 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 193, 197 (stating that since the passage of the Fifth Amendment, the purpose and 
meaning of the Amendment has become increasingly unclear as technology has evolved). 
 2 See Weber, supra note 1, at 457, 460 (stating that the traditional approach taken by courts, 
which holds that the Fifth Amendment protects against an individual incriminating themselves by 
being compelled to produce testimonial evidence, has become more difficult for modern courts to 
apply as individuals do more and more on their encrypted electronic devices); see, e.g., State v. 
Stahl, 206 So. 3d 128, 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (finding that when a phone has a passcode 
and is registered to a defendant, the State can compel the password to the phone because it is a 
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smartphones, computers, and other portable electronic devices for tasks in-
cluding online banking, dating, and communications.3 As these technologies 
have been integrated into almost every aspect of modern daily life, tele-
phone and computer companies have made encryption technology easier for 
customers to use and devices more difficult for unauthorized users to ac-
cess.4 These factors have created an environment in which law enforcement 
often must obtain the passwords for electronic devices directly from the 
owner in order to access those devices.5 
The two seminal Supreme Court cases that courts look to when deter-
mining whether an individual has a Fifth Amendment right to refuse to give 
their passcodes to law enforcement are Fisher v. United States, decided in 
                                                                                                                           
foregone conclusion that the defendant knows that password); Commonwealth v. Baust, 89 Va. 
Cir. 267, 271 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2014) (finding that the only way a passcode could be determined to be 
a foregone conclusion would be if the government already knew the passcode). 
 3 Weber, supra note 1, at 458; Arron Smith, Record Shares of Americans Now Own 
Smartphones, Have Home Broadband, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 3, 2017), http://www.pew
research.org/fact-tank/2017/01/12/evolution-of-technology [https://perma.cc/F29Q-GJRR] (stating 
that as of January 2017, 77% of Americans own a smartphone, a figure that has more than doubled 
since 2011, and that this trend is expected to continue with 92% of younger adults owning 
smartphones). 
 4 See Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 128 n.1 (finding that all Apple products running iOS 8 or later have 
an encryption key that is tied to the user’s passcode, which Apple does not possess). 
 5 See id. (stating that as iPhone users download the iOS 8 or newer operating system, law en-
forcement officials will not be able to access those phones without owners providing their 
passcodes). As of September 2014, technology giant Apple implemented the iOS 8 operating system 
for its devices. Apple Announces iOS 8 Available September 17, Apple Newsroom (Oct. 3, 2017), 
https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2014/09/09Apple-Announces-iOS-8-Available-September-17 
[https://perma.cc/P474-LSUW]. The main purpose of the iOS 8 operating system update was to 
ensure the privacy of Apple’s customers by removing Apple’s ability to unlock its customers’ 
phones by retrieving their passcodes. See Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 128 n.1 (finding that Apple will no 
longer perform data extractions in response to warrants for iOS systems because the data is now 
protected by an encryption key tied to the owner of the phone’s passcode, which Apple no longer 
has access to); see also Craig Timber, Apple Will No Longer Unlock Most iPhones, iPads for 
Police, Even with Search Warrants, WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/business/technology/2014/09/17/2612af58-3ed2-11e4-b03f-de718edeb92f_story.html?utm_
term=.5f2a48ad3398 [https://perma.cc/DG6G-8LVH] (stating that Apple’s iOS 8 will prevent the 
company from unlocking customer’s iPhones or iPads). Practically, what this means is Apple does 
not have the ability to access these passcodes, so it can no longer provide a phone’s passcode to 
law enforcement when served subpoenas for them. Id.; John L. Potapchuk, A Second Bite at the 
Apple: Federal Courts’ Authority to Compel Technical Assistance to Government Agents in Ac-
cessing Encrypted Smartphone Data Under the All Writs Act, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1403, 1404 (2016) 
(stating that Apple’s iOS 8 operating system and the Google Android’s operating system devel-
oped during the same time period, which collectively compose over ninety-six percent of the op-
erating systems on the market, have encryption capabilities believed to be impossible to break 
without the owner’s passcode); Lily Hay Newman, Here’s How to Keep Apple from Sharing Your 
iPhone Data with the Police, Slate (Feb. 18, 2018), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/
2014/09/18/if_you_use_a_passcode_in_ios_8_apple_won_t_be_able_to_give_your_personal.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q393-D5EU] (stating that Apple, with its iOS 8 operating system, will no longer 
be able to comply with warrants requesting the company to unlock its customers’ iPhones). 
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1976, and Doe v. United States, decided in 1988.6 Both cases were decided 
prior to the ubiquitous nature of technology today and prior to the prolifera-
tion of smartphones in our society.7 This has left state governments and in-
dividual courts to determine the extent to which individuals have a Fifth 
Amendment right of refusal to provide law enforcement their passcodes, 
even when law enforcement officers have secured a warrant to search their 
encrypted devices.8 Courts have answered this question in a variety of dif-
ferent ways with a range of results, but no court prior to the Florida Second 
District Court of Appeals in 2016, in State v. Stahl, has completely stripped 
away an individual’s Fifth Amendment right to refuse to give law enforce-
ment the password to a personal encrypted device.9 
                                                                                                                           
 6 See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 218–19 n.9 (1988) (establishing that a combination 
to a wall safe, which courts have interpreted as equivalent to a passcode, is considered testimonial 
because recalling the passcode forces a defendant to reveal a product of his mind); Fisher v. Unit-
ed States, 425 U.S. 391, 411–14 (1976) (determining that when the government knows the loca-
tion, existence, and authenticity of evidence with reasonable particularity, that evidence loses its 
Fifth Amendment protections because the act of producing that evidence adds little to nothing to 
the government’s case). 
 7 See Weber, supra note 1, at 458 (finding that we are now more reliant than ever before on 
technology—we use it to pay our bills, make purchases at grocery stores, check bank accounts, 
and we perform many of these activities through our smartphones). 
 8 See id. at 460 (stating that courts have differed on how to best handle the compulsion of 
passcodes, which could be incriminating, when the defendant providing that passcode is the only 
way to access that defendant’s electronic device); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 933.07 (West 2001 
& Supp. 2012) (stating that a judge must find that there is probable cause to believe that the evi-
dence that is being searched for will be located where the search warrant is being issued in order 
to issue a search warrant); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 1 (2016) (stating that a judge must find 
that there is probable cause to believe that the evidence being searched for “is in a house, place, 
vessel or vehicle or in the possession of the person anywhere within the commonwealth and terri-
torial waters thereof”); Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 136 (finding that when a phone has a passcode and is 
registered to a defendant the State can compel the password to the phone because it is a foregone 
conclusion that the defendant knows that passcode); Baust, 89 Va. Cir. at 267 (finding that the 
only way that a passcode could be a foregone conclusion would be if the government already 
knew the passcode); Newman, supra note 5, at 195 (stating that courts have lacked consistency 
when deciding if compelling the production of an individual’s passcode violates that individual’s 
Fifth Amendment rights). 
 9 See United States v. Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F.3d 238, 248 (3d Cir. 2017) (determin-
ing that because the government could show through forensics that there were photographs on the 
defendant’s hard drive consistent with child pornography and the hard drive was taken from the 
defendant’s possession, the government met the requisite requirements of the foregone conclusion 
doctrine, so the defendant’s passcode could be compelled); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces 
Tecum, 670 F.3d 1335, 1346–47 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding that the government did not know with 
reasonable particularity that there was child pornography on the defendant’s hard drive, so the 
government could not compel the defendant to relinquish the passcode to the hard drive); Stahl, 
206 So. 3d at 136 (finding that knowledge that a cellphone is registered to a defendant and that the 
phone has a passcode are enough to establish that the passcode is a foregone conclusion and to 
compel the defendant to surrender that passcode). 
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Part I of this Comment will present the two seminal Supreme Court 
cases that provide the precedent for all password protection cases.10 Part II 
will lay out the facts and holding of the Stahl case.11 Part III will show how 
both federal and state courts before Stahl have applied the foregone conclu-
sion doctrine as a balancing test between individual privacy rights and state 
interests.12 Finally, Part IV will analyze how the court in Stahl incorrectly 
applied the foregone conclusion doctrine, by finding that every passcode is 
a foregone conclusion when a phone is shown to be registered to an indi-
vidual and has a passcode, and the potential consequences of other courts 
adopting the Stahl interpretation.13 
I. SEMINAL CASES THAT HAVE CREATED THE FRAMEWORK FOR ALL FIFTH 
AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS RELATING TO ENCRYPTION 
Courts dealing with cases involving encryption technology look at two 
seminal Supreme Court cases, Doe v. United States and Fisher v. United 
States, for precedent and guidance when ruling on passcode compulsion 
cases.14 Although these two opinions were written before the proliferation 
of encryption technology, their respective establishment of what evidence is 
considered testimonial and what evidence is considered a foregone conclu-
sion in a password context is still considered precedential law today.15 
In Doe, the Supreme Court established the fundamental distinction be-
tween being compelled to hand over a key that unlocks a safe with incrimi-
                                                                                                                           
 10 See infra notes 14–36 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 37–63 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 64–89 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 90–102 and accompanying text. 
 14 See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 n.1 (1988) (establishing that a combination to 
a wall safe, which courts have interpreted as the equivalent of a passcode, is considered testimoni-
al because recalling the passcode forces a defendant to reveal a product of his mind); Fisher v. 
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976) (finding that even if evidence is testimonial, it can still be 
compelled if the government knows with reasonable particularity the location, possession, and 
authenticity of that evidence); see also State v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 128, 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2016) (narrowing the Fifth Amendment protections of Fisher and Doe by finding that when a 
phone has a passcode and is registered to a defendant, the government can compel the password to 
the phone because it is a foregone conclusion that the defendant knows that password); Common-
wealth v. Baust, 89 Va. Cir. 267, 271 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2014) (widening the Fifth Amendment protec-
tions of Fisher and Doe by finding that the only way a passcode could be a deemed a foregone 
conclusion would be if the government already knew the passcode). 
 15 See Doe, 487 U.S. at 210; Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411; United States v. Greenfield, 831 F.3d 
106, 127 (2d Cir. 2016) (following Fisher, by finding that the district court was incorrect in find-
ing that the defendant’s production of documents was a foregone conclusion because the govern-
ment did not prove the existence, location, and authenticity of the documents at the time of the 
issuance of the subpoena); United States v. Green, 272 F.3d 748, 753 (5th Cir. 2001) (following 
Doe in finding that compelling a defendant to open combination locks with illegal firearms inside 
violated his Fifth Amendment rights because giving over the combinations is a testimonial act). 
2018] State Foregone Conclusion Doctrine Ruling Deals Blow to Digital Privacy 229 
nating evidence inside and being compelled to provide the combination to 
unlock that same safe.16 The defendant in Doe was the target of a grand jury 
investigation into whether he had fraudulently manipulated the receipts for 
oil cargo and unreported income.17 As part of this investigation, the banks 
where Doe’s accounts were located were subpoenaed to produce Doe’s ac-
count information; however, they refused to provide this information with-
out Doe’s consent.18 Doe argued that consenting to allow his banks to send 
the government his account information would violate his Fifth Amendment 
rights.19 The Supreme Court found that compelling the target of a grand 
jury investigation to authorize foreign banks to disclose records of his ac-
counts, without identifying those documents or acknowledging their exist-
ence, did not implicate the Fifth Amendment because it did not require him 
to make a testimonial communication.20 The Court found that compelling 
an individual to authorize a bank to disclose the records of his accounts was 
akin to forcing a defendant to surrender the key to a safe with incriminating 
evidence inside of it.21 The act of surrendering a key is not protected by the 
Fifth Amendment because it does not force an individual to reveal the con-
tents of his mind.22 If, in lieu of a key, the warrant tried to compel an indi-
                                                                                                                           
 16 See Doe, 487 U.S. at 210 n.9 (finding that being compelled to give a combination to a wall 
safe is testimonial because it forces that individual to express the contents of his mind, while sur-
rendering a key to a strongbox is not testimonial because it does not force an individual to express 
the contents of his mind). 
 17 Id. at 203. 
 18 Id. The banks where Doe’s accounts were located were in the Cayman Islands and Bermu-
da. Id. 
 19 Id. at 208 (arguing that consenting to allow his bank to send the government his account 
information is a testimonial act because it is a statement of the defendant that could lead to poten-
tially incriminating evidence against him). 
 20 Id. at 217–18 (finding that the defendant authorizing his bank to disclose his records did not 
express that he had any control over the accounts, or that the banks were correct that these ac-
counts belonged to him, just that he was authorizing his bank to turn over information that, in the 
bank’s opinion, belonged to the defendant). 
 21 Id. at 210; see Nicholas Soares, The Right to Remain Encrypted: The Self-Incrimination 
Doctrine in the Digital Age, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 2001, 2005 (stating that the Supreme Court has 
distinguished between physical acts of surrender and acts that force a defendant to divulge the 
contents of their mind, by finding that the former does not invoke Fifth Amendment protections 
while the latter does). 
 22 Doe, 487 U.S. at 210 n.9. The Supreme Court found in Fisher that if something is not a 
product of a defendant’s mind, it is not protected by Fifth Amendment privilege, even if what is 
being compelled would lead to incriminating evidence. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409. The Court 
found that the Fifth Amendment does not apply to all compelled production of incriminating evi-
dence; it only applies when the government is compelling testimony that is a testimonial commu-
nication. Id. The Court mentions circumstances where it has found that the compulsion of incrimi-
nating evidence is not testimonial because the evidence is not communicative in nature. Id. The 
examples the Court has provided when it has found that compulsion of incriminating evidence is 
not testimonial are: blood samples, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763–64 (1966); hand-
writing exemplars, Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 265–67 (1967); voice exemplars, United 
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vidual to provide a combination to open that same safe, that combination 
would be protected under the Fifth Amendment privilege.23 Forcing an in-
dividual to surrender a passcode would be demanding them to express the 
contents of their mind, making the action testimonial.24 Courts have gener-
ally interpreted, prior to the Second Court of Appeals in State v. Stahl, that 
if a combination to a wall safe is testimonial, then so is a passcode to an 
encrypted device.25 
Another seminal case regarding Fifth Amendment protections in the 
digital era is Fisher v. United States.26 The defendants in Fisher were being 
investigated for possible civil and criminal liability under federal income 
tax laws by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).27 The IRS issued a subpoe-
na to compel documents that were used to prepare the defendants’ tax re-
turns that the defendants had obtained from their accountants.28 The de-
fendants appealed the subpoena, stating that being compelled to hand over 
these documents to the government would violate their Fifth Amendment 
                                                                                                                           
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222–23 (1967); and wearing clothing of the person who committed 
the crime, Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910). Id. 
 23 See Doe, 487 U.S. at 210 n.9 (determining that compelling the defendant to authorize his 
bank to disclose information relating to his account was more like giving over a key to a safe, 
since complying with the warrant did not force him to give up a product of his mind). The Court 
emphasized this difference, because in order for an act to be protected by the Fifth Amendment it 
must be testimonial, and in order for an act to be testimonial, a defendant must be compelled to 
perform an act that forces him to gives up a product of his mind. Id. 
 24 Id.; see also Soares, supra note 21, at 2004 (stating that the Supreme Court has found that 
evidence is testimonial, and thus induces Fifth Amendment protections, if that evidence is a com-
pelled communication that forces the defendant to reveal the contents of his or her mind). 
 25 See Doe, 487 U.S. at 210 n.9 (establishing that a combination to a safe is protected by Fifth 
Amendment protections); see also United States v. Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F.3d 238, 248 
(3d Cir. 2017) (finding that because the government was able to show through forensics that there 
were photographs on the defendant’s hard drive that were consistent with child pornography, and 
because the hard drive was taken from the defendant’s possession, the government met the requi-
site requirements of the foregone conclusion doctrine and the defendant’s passcode could be com-
pelled); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 670 F.3d 1335, 1346–47 (11th Cir. 2012) (find-
ing that the government did not know with reasonable particularity that there was child pornogra-
phy on the defendant’s hard drive, so the government could not compel the defendant to turn over 
the passcode to the hard drive). 
 26 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 412; see Fern Kletter, Annotation, Construction and Application of 
“Foregone Conclusion” Exception to Fifth Amendment Privilege against Self-Incrimination, 25 
A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 10 (2017) (finding that the foregone conclusion doctrine has been used to 
compel passcodes to encrypted devices). 
 27 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 394. The Supreme Court decided two separate cases in Fisher, both 
involving the IRS attempting to compel accountant working papers from the defendants. Id. 
 28 Id. at 395. The papers were subsequently given by the defendants to their attorneys with the 
hope of invoking attorney client privilege, however the Court found this argument unpersuasive. 
Id. at 395, 401–06. 
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rights because handing over the documents was a testimonial act.29 The Su-
preme Court found it unnecessary to determine if providing the documents 
to the government was a testimonial act.30 The Court held that a subpoena 
issued by the IRS seeking the defendants’ accountant’s working papers used 
in the preparation of tax returns could be compelled even if they were pro-
tected by Fifth Amendment privilege because their existence was a foregone 
conclusion.31 The government already knew that the tax returns existed, 
where they were located, and that they were authentic, so producing these 
documents to the IRS would “add little or nothing” to the government’s 
case.32 The production of the documents adds little or nothing to the gov-
ernment case because the actual production of the documents, which other-
wise would tacitly concede the existence of the documents being com-
pelled, loses all prejudicial effect to the defendant, because the government 
already knows the location, authenticity, and existence of the documents.33 
When testimonial evidence that would normally be protected by the Fifth 
Amendment adds little or nothing to a case against a defendant, no constitu-
tional rights are violated.34 The compulsion of evidence that adds little or 
                                                                                                                           
 29 Id. at 395. The Court found that responding to the subpoena may invoke Fifth Amendment 
protections; however, it was unnecessary for the Court to decide if it did because the papers were 
foregone conclusion, voiding any possible Fifth Amendment protections. Id. at 411–12. 
 30 Id. at 411–12 (finding that testimonial evidence that normally would be protected by the 
Fifth Amendment loses its Fifth Amendment protections when the government already knows the 
existence, location, and authenticity of the evidence, so that the actual production of the docu-
ments adds little to nothing to the government’s case). 
 31 Id. at 410–13. The Court found that the working papers were testimonial not due to the 
nature of the documents, but rather because producing the documents to the government has a 
communicative aspect by itself, which makes the production of the documents testimonial. Id. The 
working papers that were subpoenaed were not created by the defendant and do not contain any 
communicative declarations that would make them testimonial. Id. Instead they are testimonial 
because the act of production can be testimonial when it concedes the existence of the papers and 
that they are in the possession of the defendant. Id. 
 32 See id. at 411 (finding that when the government knows the location, authenticity, and 
existence of evidence, the act of producing that evidence is no longer testimonial in nature). The 
government knew the location of the documents because they knew the defendant transferred the 
papers to his attorney. Id. at 394. The government verified the possession and authenticity of the 
documents through independent evidence. Id. at 394, 411. Due to the government’s prior 
knowledge of the defendant’s tax documents being compelled, the defendant’s actual handing 
over of the documents to the government would add little to nothing to the government’s case. Id. 
at 411. 
 33 Id. at 411; see Kletter, supra, note 26, at 10 (stating that Fifth Amendment protections do 
not apply to evidence when the location, existence, and authenticity of the evidence is already 
known, so that even if the act of production conveys a fact regarding the existence, location, or 
authenticity of the evidence, that fact is already a foregone conclusion). 
 34 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411 (finding that when the production of evidence adds little or 
nothing to the government’s case, that production loses its Fifth Amendment protections). When 
the government knows the location, existence, and authenticity of evidence, that evidence loses its 
testimonial nature. Id. When this happens, the act of handing over the evidence is no longer a 
testimonial act, but instead an act of surrender. Id. 
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nothing to a case against a defendant is not seen as a question of testimony, 
but as one of surrender.35 If the government is aware of the testimonial as-
pect of the evidence they are compelling, and the government is not at-
tempting to prove the testimonial evidence through the order, then compul-
sion of the evidence does not violate Fifth Amendment protections.36 
II. STAHL’S DIVERGENT INTERPRETATION OF THE FOREGONE  
CONCLUSION DOCTRINE 
Section A of this Part will discuss the trial court’s ruling in State v. 
Stahl.37 Section B will discuss the Florida Second District Court of Appeals 
ruling in Stahl.38 
A. Trial Court’s Ruling in Stahl 
In December 2016, the Second District Court of Appeals of Florida in 
State v. Stahl granted the State of Florida’s motion to compel the defend-
ant’s passcode to his iPhone 5.39 In Stahl, a woman shopping in a store 
caught the defendant attempting to film underneath her skirt.40 The defend-
ant was later caught, arrested, and charged with video voyeurism.41 During 
his arrest, the defendant told the Sarasota County Police that he did not have 
his cellphone on him and that it was located at his house.42 The police ob-
                                                                                                                           
 35 See id. (finding that the government already knew the location, authenticity, and existence 
of the documents being requested, making the production of those documents no longer testimoni-
al); supra note 33. 
 36 See DAVID M. NISSMAN & ED HAGEN, LAW OF CONFESSIONS, § 3:19, Westlaw (database 
updated June 2017) (stating that an act of production is not testimonial when the existence and the 
possession of the evidence sought are already known by the government). 
 37 See infra notes 39–52 and accompanying text. 
 38 See infra notes 53–63 and accompanying text. 
 39 State v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 128, 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016). When the State filed its mo-
tion to compel Stahl’s passcode, the State understood that the newer versions of Apple’s operating 
system would lock and erase the contents of the phone if there were ten failed attempts to enter the 
passcode. Id. at 128 n.1. Also, Apple would not run extractions on any phones with the iOS 8 or 
later operating system in response to search warrants because the files that the government would 
want to be extracted are protected by an encryptions key that is tied to the owner of the phone’s 
passcode, which Apple does not have access to. Id. (citing Privacy, APPLE INC., https://www.apple.
com/privacy/government-information-requests/ [https://perma.cc/BM4L-3KVA]). At the time the 
State filed its motion to compel, it was unable to determine what iOS operating system was in-
stalled on Stahl’s phone. Id. 
 40 Id. at 127. 
 41 Id. at 128. Video voyeurism is defined in Florida as intentionally using or installing an 
imaging device to “secretly view, broadcast, or record a person, for their own amusement, enter-
tainment, sexual arousal, gratification, profit, or for the purpose of degrading or abusing another 
person, who is dressing, undressing, or privately exposing the body, at a place and time when that 
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, without that person’s knowledge or consent.” FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 810.14 (West 2007). 
 42 Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 128. 
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tained a warrant to retrieve the phone from his house and search it, but they 
could not unlock it without the defendant’s passcode.43 The defendant re-
fused to provide the police with his passcode and the State subsequently 
filed a motion to compel the defendant to provide his passcode.44 
The trial court denied the State’s motion to compel and found that 
forcing the defendant to surrender the passcode would violate his Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.45 The act of giving the 
passcode would, at the most rudimentary level, force a defendant to “use the 
contents of his mind” in compelling him to recall the passcode.46 If the 
compulsion of evidence forces a defendant to use the contents of his mind, 
then that evidence is protected by the Fifth Amendment because it is incrim-
inating and testimonial in nature.47 
The trial court also found the State could not compel disclosure of the 
passcode to the defendant’s phone by means of the foregone conclusion 
doctrine.48 The foregone conclusion doctrine, originally established in Fish-
er, allows courts to compel evidence that would ordinarily be protected un-
der the Fifth Amendment because that evidence is already known by the 
State.49 The State must satisfy the three prongs of the foregone conclusion 
                                                                                                                           
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id.; see Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409–10 (1976). For defendants to invoke 
their Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination, they must show that they are being 
compelled to provide evidence against themselves, that the evidence is incriminating, and that the 
evidence is testimonial. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409–10. For evidence to be testimonial in nature, the 
evidence must come from a defendant being compelled to perform an act that forces him to give 
up a product of his mind. Id.; see Soares, supra note 21, at 2004 (stating that the Supreme Court 
has found that evidence is testimonial, and thus induces Fifth Amendment protections, if that evi-
dence is a compelled communication that forces the defendant to reveal the contents of his or her 
mind). If the evidence was given willingly or created willingly, it will not meet the testimonial 
requirement. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409–10. Just because evidence is incriminating does not make it 
testimonial. Id. 
 46 Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 131. 
 47 Id.; see Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 201 n.9 (1988) (finding that forcing a defend-
ant to give the combination to a wall safe violates his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination, but that forcing a defendant to give a key to a wall safe does not violate that right, 
because the former requires that the defendant use the contents of his mind and the latter does 
not). Forcing a defendant to give the combination to a wall safe violates his Fifth Amendment 
rights against self-incrimination while forcing a defendant to give a key to a wall safe does not. 
See Doe, 487 U.S. at 201 n.9 (same). This is because the former requires that the defendant use the 
contents of his mind to give the passcode and the latter does not. Id. 
 48 See Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 131 (explaining the trial court’s conclusion that the State could not 
rely on the foregone conclusion doctrine to compel Stahl to give the State the passcode to his 
phone because the State could not establish with reasonable particularity the three prongs of the 
foregone conclusion doctrine, which are location, possession, and authenticity of the evidence 
sought). 
 49 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411 (finding that when the state can prove location, possession, and 
authenticity of the evidence being requested, then the question is not of testimony but of surren-
dering the evidence). 
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doctrine by proving that the State already has knowledge of the location, 
existence, and authenticity of the evidence.50 
 The trial court found that the foregone conclusion doctrine did not ap-
ply because the State failed to establish the location element of the foregone 
conclusion doctrine, since it was unable to prove that the phone in the 
State’s possession was the same phone that the defendant allegedly had in 
the store.51 Furthermore, the State failed to establish possession because the 
phone came from a home where multiple people lived and the State failed 
to prove that the phone belonged to the defendant.52 
 B. Florida Second District Court of Appeals Ruling in Stahl 
The Second District Court of Appeals of Florida (hereinafter “appeals 
court”) reversed the trial court’s decision for two reasons.53 The appeals 
court found that the passcode was not testimonial and thus, not protected by 
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.54 Additionally, 
the court found that the foregone conclusion doctrine applied to the defend-
ant’s passcode, so even if the compulsion of the passcode was testimonial, it 
could be compelled.55 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Id. at 411–12. The act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena can be testimonial 
whether or not the evidence itself is testimonial. Id. This is because compliance with a subpoena 
tacitly concedes that the evidence being requested is owned by the individual to whom the sub-
poena was issued and that the documents handed over are those documents described in the sub-
poena. Id. If the state can prove location, possession, and authenticity of the evidence being re-
quested in the subpoena, however, then the question is not of testimony but of surrendering the 
evidence, since any fact that the production of that evidence conveys about the existence, location, 
or authenticity of the evidence is already known to the government. Id. 
 51 Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 131; United States v. Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 
2017) (finding in a child pornography case that the government met the location elements of the 
foregone conclusion doctrine because the government had established that forensic evidence of the 
images on the defendant’s external hard drives were consistent with child pornography). 
 52 Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 131. When the trial court denied the State’s motion to compel the 
passcode, the State appealed to the Second District Court of Appeals of Florida and was granted 
certiorari. Id. at 129. 
 53 State v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 128, 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (finding the trial court misin-
terpreted the meaning of testimonial communications and the three prongs of the foregone conclu-
sion doctrine). 
 54 Id. at 133–34 (finding that Stahl being compelled to give law enforcement the passcode to 
his phone was not a testimonial act because the passcode was sought only for its contents and the 
passcode itself has no other evidentiary value or significance). 
 55 Id. at 135–36; see Kletter, supra, note 26, at 10 (stating that evidence is a foregone conclu-
sion when the location, existence, and authenticity of the evidence is already known, so that even 
if the act of production conveys a fact regarding the existence, location, or authenticity of the 
evidence, that fact is already a foregone conclusion). 
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The holding in Stahl does not adhere to the precedent set by the Su-
preme Court in Doe and Fisher.56 Although the appeals court agreed that an 
act is testimonial if it forces a defendant to use the contents of his or her 
mind, either explicitly or implicitly, to communicate some fact, the Stahl 
court determined that courts across the United States, and specifically the 
trial court in this case, have not properly considered the law as stated in Doe 
and Fisher.57 The appeals court found that the contents of an accused per-
son’s mind must be “extensively used” in the defendant’s response to a war-
rant or must directly relate him or her to the offense that he or she is being 
charged with in order to have testimonial significance warranting Fifth 
Amendment protections.58 If the compelled evidence does not extensively 
use the contents of the defendant’s mind or directly relate the defendant to 
the offense that he or she has been charged with, then the compelled infor-
mation does not have testimonial significance regardless of whether it is a 
product of someone’s mind, and is therefore not protected by Fifth Amend-
ment protections.59 
In reversing the trial court’s decision, the appeals court also deter-
mined that the foregone conclusion doctrine should have been found to ap-
                                                                                                                           
 56 See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 201 n.9 (1988) (determining that the combination 
to a wall safe is testimonial because forcing a defendant to recall a passcode would be forcing a 
defendant to reveal a product of his mind); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976) (de-
termining that the government could compel the defendant to give the government his or her fi-
nancial statements because the government already knew the location, possession, and authenticity 
of the statements so that the defendant’s compelled testimony would add little to nothing to the 
government’s case); Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 135–36 (finding the trial court misinterpreted the mean-
ing of testimonial communications and the three prongs of the foregone conclusion doctrine). 
 57 See Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 133–34 (finding that in order for compelled evidence to be testi-
monial, that evidence must have independent testimonial significance). The appeals court found 
that the trial court as well as other courts have misread Doe and Fisher by not taking into account 
that in order for compelled evidence to be protected by the Fifth Amendment, that evidence must 
do more than merely force a defendant to use the contents of his or her mind when giving the 
compelled evidence. Id. That evidence must have testimonial significance on its own in order for 
it to be protected by the Fifth Amendment. Id. Relating this to the facts in Stahl’s case, the court 
found that the passcode did not have any intrinsic testimonial significance. Id. Because providing 
a passcode does not equate to the defendant acknowledging that the phone contains evidence of 
the crime for which he was being accused, the passcode should not be protected by the Fifth 
Amendment. Id. 
 58 See id. at 134. The Appeals Court found that the passcode was not testimonial because the 
passcode was solely being compelled to open up the phone, the actual code itself did not have 
testimonial significance. Id. If the passcode itself does not have testimonial significance, the de-
fendant would not have to extensively use his mind when giving the State the passcode, so the 
passcode would not be testimonial. Id. 
 59 See id. (finding that compelling evidence that does not force a defendant to either “exten-
sively use[]” the contents of his mind or relate him directly to the offense he is being charged with 
does not reach the level of testimonial evidence, and thus does not invoke Fifth Amendment pro-
tections). 
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ply.60 The appeals court found that, even if the passcode were testimonial, it 
did not merit protection under the Fifth Amendment because the State had 
established the existence, possession, and authenticity of the compelled evi-
dence through independent means.61 The appeals court found that the State 
established that the phone could not be searched without entering a 
passcode, and so a passcode must exist.62 The appeals court also determined 
that the State established, with reasonable particularity, that the phone was 
his, and therefore that the passcode would be in his possession.63 
III. STATE AND FEDERAL APPLICATION OF THE FOREGONE  
CONCLUSION DOCTRINE 
The foregone conclusion doctrine established by the Supreme Court in 
Fisher v. United States has been particularly important in Fifth Amendment 
self-incrimination cases that deal with the decryption of data.64 With courts 
interpreting the Supreme Court’s decision in Doe v. United States to mean 
that passcodes are protected by the Fifth Amendment and with encryption 
technology becoming increasingly sophisticated, in many situations the on-
                                                                                                                           
 60 See id. at 135–36 (finding that because the phone needed a passcode to be unlocked and 
that the State established with reasonable particularity through cellphone carrier records that the 
phone belonged to Stahl, the State had proven the location, authenticity, and existence of the 
passcode, making it a foregone conclusion). 
 61 See id. (finding that the passcode was a foregone conclusion because the government knew 
the location, authenticity, and existence of the evidence being compelled). The appeals court found 
that the Sarasota Circuit Court incorrectly applied the foregone conclusion doctrine when they 
determined that it did not apply because the State had failed to prove location and the possession 
of the evidence on Stahl’s phone. Id. The appeals court held instead that it was not determinative 
that the State found Stahl’s phone in a house where five other individuals lived, nor was it deter-
minative that the State could not definitively prove the phone they found at Stahl’s residence was 
the phone he had with him at the store. Id. 
 62 Id. at 136. 
 63 Id. The appeals court found that the phone the police recovered at the defendant’s home was 
in fact the defendant’s phone because the phone’s number was registered to the defendant. Id. This, in 
conjunction with the fact that the phone required a passcode to be unlocked, was enough for the ap-
peals court to find that it was a foregone conclusion that the defendant knew that passcode to the 
phone. Id. 
 64 See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 201 n.9 (1988) (noting that courts have interpreted 
the Supreme Court’s determination in Fisher—that a combination to a wall safe merits Fifth 
Amendment protections—to extend to modern passcodes and passwords used in encrypted elec-
tronic devices so as to also categorize them as testimonial, because passcodes and passwords are 
akin to a combination to a wall safe in that they are products of a person’s mind); Fisher v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 391, 412–14 (1976) (noting that courts have applied the foregone conclusion 
doctrine when evaluating motions to compel encrypted electronics); see also State v. Stahl, 206 
So. 3d 128, 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (finding that when a phone has a passcode and is regis-
tered to a defendant, the State can compel the password to the phone because it is a foregone con-
clusion that the defendant knows that password); Commonwealth v. Baust, 89 Va. Cir. 267, 
271(Va. Cir. Ct. 2014) (finding that the only way a passcode could be considered a foregone con-
clusion would be if the government already knew the passcode). 
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ly way the government can gain access to defendants’ electronic devices is 
by employing the foregone conclusion doctrine.65 
With the applicability and importance of the foregone conclusion doc-
trine growing as technology evolves, it has been left to individual courts to 
interpret this doctrine, which was established before the modern technologi-
cal era.66 This had led to a range of interpretations of the foregone conclu-
sion doctrine, which is due in part to the ambiguous language that the Su-
preme Court used to set the standard for the foregone conclusion doctrine in 
Fisher.67 
In order to apply the foregone conclusion doctrine, the government 
needs to know the location, authenticity, and existence of evidence, with 
reasonable particularity, so that the compelled evidence adds little to the 
government’s case.68 A majority of courts have applied this language in 
                                                                                                                           
 65 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 412–14 (establishing the foregone conclusion doctrine). The Court 
held that when the compulsion of evidence forces a defendant to make a testimonial communica-
tion, that evidence is protected by the Fifth Amendment. See id. (finding that testimonial commu-
nications force defendants to use the contents of their minds, which are protected by the Fifth 
Amendment). If that evidence is found to be a forgone conclusion, however, it loses its Fifth 
Amendment protection and the government may compel the evidence. See id. (establishing that 
when the government knows the location, authenticity, and existence of evidence, that evidence is 
a foregone conclusion and is no longer protected by the Fifth Amendment); Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 
135–36 (finding that if defendant Stahl surrendering his passcode was found to be testimonial, the 
passcode could still be compelled because the State sufficiently satisfied all the requisite elements 
of the foregone conclusion doctrine). 
 66 See, e.g., Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 136 (finding that when a phone that has a passcode and is 
registered to a defendant, the State can compel the password to the phone because it is a foregone 
conclusion that the defendant knows that password); Baust, 89 Va. Cir. at 271 (finding that the 
only way that a passcode could be a foregone conclusion would be if the government already 
knew the passcode). 
 67 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410–11 (holding that the government must know the location, au-
thenticity, and possession of evidence in order for that evidence to be considered a foregone con-
clusion). Compare Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 136 (finding that when a phone has a passcode and is reg-
istered to a defendant, the State can compel the password to the phone because it is a foregone 
conclusion that the defendant knows that password), with Baust, 89 Va. Cir. at 271 (finding that 
the only way that a passcode could be considered a foregone conclusion would be if the govern-
ment already knew the passcode itself); see also Ashley Verdon, International Travel with a 
“Digital Briefcase”: If Customs Officials Can Search a Laptop, Will the Right Against Self-
Incrimination Contravene This Authority?, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 105, 136–37 (2009) (stating that the 
foregone conclusions standard of proof, requiring that the government be able to independently 
prove knowledge of the existence, possession, and authenticity of compelled documents, is an 
ambiguous standard of proof).  
 68 See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 44–45 (2000) (holding that the government must 
know the location, authenticity, and possession of evidence with reasonable particularity in order 
for that evidence to be a foregone conclusion); Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410–11 (holding that the gov-
ernment must know the location, authenticity, and possession of the evidence in order for that 
evidence to be considered a foregone conclusion). In Hubble, the Supreme Court applied the fore-
gone conclusion doctrine established in Fisher and used the language “reasonable particularity” 
when describing the extent to which the government must know the location, authenticity, and 
possession of the evidence being compelled. 530 U.S. at 32–33. After the Court’s decision in 
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Fisher as a way to balance individual privacy interests with the need for law 
enforcement to gain access to electronic devices that they have established 
contain evidence with reasonable particularity.69 
Both federal and state courts have attempted to reasonably apply the 
foregone conclusion doctrine.70 Two examples of federal cases contemplat-
ing the application of the foregone conclusion doctrine are United States v. 
Doe and United States v. Apple MacPro Computer.71 In Doe, the Eleventh 
Circuit denied the government’s motion to compel a password for the de-
fendant’s electronic devices, finding that the foregone conclusion doctrine 
did not apply to the facts of the case.72 The law enforcement officials in 
                                                                                                                           
Hubble, that language is what courts look to when conducting a test of whether to apply the fore-
gone conclusion doctrine. See id. In Hubble, the Court found that the foregone conclusion doctrine 
did not apply because unlike the facts in Fisher, the government did not know with reasonable 
particularity the existence, possession, and authenticity of the subpoenaed documents. Id. at 44–
45. In Fisher, the Court determined that these elements were met because the Internal Revenue 
Service knew that the defendant’s accountants had prepared the documents and the documents 
were in the possession of his attorney, allowing the government to independently confirm the 
documents’ existence and location. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411. Here, the government did not show 
that it had any prior knowledge of the existence or location of the documents produced by the 
defendant. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 44–45; United States v. Greenfield, 831 F.3d 106, 116 (2d Cir. 
2016) (finding that the government must show that it knew the location and existence of evidence 
with reasonable particularity in order for that evidence to be a foregone conclusion); Slavin v. 
Artus, No. 05-CV-0870 (JS), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2939, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2010) (find-
ing that it is a settled proposition that an individual may be required to produce incriminating 
documents, which would otherwise be protected under the Fifth Amendment, if the government 
knows with reasonable particularity the existence and location of the documents). 
 69 See United States v. Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F.3d 238, 248 (3d Cir. 2017) (finding 
that because the government could show through forensics that there were photographs on the 
defendant’s hard drive that were consistent with child pornography and the hard drive was taken 
from the defendants possession, the government met the requisite requirements of the foregone 
conclusion doctrine and therefore the defendant’s passcode could be compelled); In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena Duces Tecum) 670 F.3d 1335, 1346–47 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding that the government 
did not know with reasonable particularity that there was child pornography on the defendant’s 
hard drive and therefore could not compel the defendant to disclose the passcode to the hard 
drive); Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 11 N.E.3d 605, 615–16 (Mass. 2014) (finding that the State 
met the elements necessary to invoke the foregone conclusion doctrine by providing evidence that 
the defendant had ownership and control of the computers when they were seized, knowledge of 
the fact that they were encrypted, and knowledge of the kind of decryption key that was necessary 
to unlock this type of encryption). 
 70 See supra note 69. 
 71 See Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F.3d at 238 (finding that because the government could 
show through forensics that there were photographs on the defendant’s hard drive that were con-
sistent with child pornography and the hard drive was taken from the defendant’s possession, the 
government met the requisite requirements of the foregone conclusion doctrine so the defendant’s 
passcode could be compelled); Doe, 670 F.3d at 1346–47 (finding that the government did not 
know with reasonable particularity that there was child pornography on the defendant’s hard drive, 
so the government could not compel the defendant to give them the passcode to the hard drive). 
 72 See Doe, 670 F.3d at 1346–47 (finding that the State had not established possession be-
cause the evidence in the defendant’s computer was insufficient to prove that there were photo-
graphs on the defendant’s hard drives). 
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Doe connected IP addresses to a hotel room, which the defendant was using 
to share child pornography, and seized all electronic devices found in the 
room.73 The government seized two laptops and five external hard drives, 
and gained access to the laptops but not to the hard drives due to encryp-
tion.74 The government filed a motion to compel the password to the en-
crypted drives, which was granted by the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.75 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit re-
versed the district court’s opinion in finding that the government did not 
know with “reasonable particularity” at the time it sought to compel the act 
of production, the specific materials on the hard drive, thereby failing to 
qualify the materials as a foregone conclusion.76 The government’s argu-
ment that the encrypted drives were capable of storing vast amounts of data, 
some of which may be incriminating, was not enough to persuade the Elev-
enth Circuit to grant the motion to compel.77 In short, although the govern-
ment physically possessed the media storage devices, it did not have actual 
knowledge of what, if anything, was stored in those encrypted drives.78 
In the 2017 case United States v. Apple MacPro Computer, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld a magistrate judge’s 
decision to compel the passcode to an external hard drive based on the gov-
ernment’s satisfaction of the foregone conclusion doctrine.79 The Third Cir-
cuit held that because the government had established that there was foren-
sic evidence of the images on the external hard drives consistent with child 
pornography, the passcode to those drives could properly be compelled.80 
                                                                                                                           
 73 Id. at 1339. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 1340. 
 76 Id. at 1346–47 (finding that the State had not established the requisite element of posses-
sion of the foregone conclusion doctrine because the State’s evidence was insufficient to prove 
that there were photographs on the defendant’s hard drives). 
 77 Id. The Eleventh Circuit did not find the government’s argument persuasive. Id. The gov-
ernment argued that since it knew that the external hard drives could store vast amounts of infor-
mation, that the hard drives were found in a room linked to child pornography, and that the hard 
drives were encrypted, that collective reasoning should be sufficient to establish that it was a fore-
gone conclusion that evidence of child pornography could have been found on the drives. Id. 
 78 Id. at 1347 (finding that the government could show that there were a series of random 
characters in the hard drive, but could not prove that this meant there were files on the hard drive 
consistent with child pornography). 
 79 See Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F.3d at 238 (finding that because the government could 
show through forensics that there were photographs on the defendant’s hard drive that were con-
sistent with child pornography and the hard drive was taken from the defendant’s possession, the 
government met the requisite requirements of the foregone conclusion doctrine, and therefore the 
defendant’s passcode could be compelled). 
 80 Id. The court found that this case was dissimilar to United States v. Doe because the gov-
ernment was able to prove authenticity, location, and possession of the evidence. Id. The govern-
ment had custody of the hard drives, prior to seizing the drives they were in the defendant’s pos-
session, and the images on the electronic devices were consistent with child pornography. Id. 
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The government had established with reasonable particularity that those 
files existed on the hard drives, and that the defendant possessed, accessed, 
and owned the devices prior to the government’s seizure.81 
State courts have also applied the doctrine in a way that balances indi-
vidual and state interests.82 The 2014 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
case Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt is one example of a state court applying the 
foregone conclusion doctrine in a way that balances individual and state 
rights.83 In Gelfgatt, a grand jury indicted the defendant on counts of for-
gery of a document, uttering a forged instrument, and larceny by false pre-
tenses of the property of another.84 These charges arose from evidence that 
the defendant, through his computers, was diverting money to himself from 
his clients’ accounts.85 The Commonwealth seized the defendant’s comput-
ers, but was unable to access them because of their encryption.86 The Com-
monwealth filed a motion to compel the passcode to the two computers, 
which the Suffolk County Superior Court denied on Fifth Amendment 
grounds.87 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed the superior 
                                                                                                                           
 81 See id. 
 82 See Gelfgatt, 11 N.E.3d at 615. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found that the 
Commonwealth had established possession, location, and authenticity of the evidence located 
inside the defendant’s encrypted computers. Id. To establish these elements, thus invoking the 
foregone conclusion doctrine, the Commonwealth showed that the defendant had ownership and 
control of the computers when they were seized, knowledge of the fact that they were encrypted, 
and knowledge of the kind of decryption key that was necessary to unlock this type of encryption. 
Id.; Vilan v. Ryan, No. 1 CA-SA 09-0066, 2009 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 514, at *21–23 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. May 21, 2009) (holding that the trial court properly held the defendant in contempt when 
she refused to turn over her house to receivership because although the act of turning over the 
house could be testimonial because the jury could see it as an admission that the defendant had 
control of the house, the government already knew that the defendant had possession of the house, 
the house existed, and the evidence the government had about her owning the house was authen-
tic, so that the act of turning over the house in receivership to the government would add little to 
nothing to the government’s case). 
 83 See Gelfgatt, 11 N.E.3d at 615 (finding that although the compulsion of the defendant’s 
passcode would normally be protected under the Fifth Amendment, the State established that they 
knew with reasonable particularity the location, authenticity, and possession of the evidence in the 
defendant’s laptops, so the Fifth Amendment protections were void). 
 84 Id. at 608. 
 85 See id. (noting that the defendant was accused of conducting a sophisticated scheme of 
diverting his clients’ money, which was supposed to be used to pay off large mortgage loans on 
residential properties, into his own accounts). 
 86 Id. at 609–10. On December 17, 2009, state police arrested the defendant. Id. The state 
police also searched the defendant’s residence, where they found several computers. Id. They 
seized two desktop computers, one laptop computer, and various other devices from the residence 
that had the ability to store electronic data. Id. 
 87 Id. at 611–12. The superior court found that even though the Commonwealth was only 
asking the defendant for a sequence of numbers that would enable the Commonwealth to access 
the information on the defendant’s computers, this would still violate the Massachusetts state and 
federal Constitutions. Id. The superior court found that compelling the defendant to give the 
Commonwealth his passcode constituted an “admission of knowledge ownership and control,” 
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court’s decision, reasoning that although the passcode was testimonial and 
thus would normally be protected under the Fifth Amendment, the Com-
monwealth knew with reasonable particularity the location, authenticity, 
and possession of the evidence on the laptops.88 As such, the forgone con-
clusion doctrine should appropriately apply.89 
IV. WHY STATE V. STAHL PRESENTS A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS 
INTERPRETATION OF THE FOREGONE CONCLUSION DOCTRINE 
The foregone conclusion doctrine, established in Fisher v. United 
States and applied by various federal and state courts since, has been uti-
lized in attempts to balance vital individual privacy rights with the need for 
law enforcement to gain access to electronic devices that they have estab-
lished with reasonable particularity contain relevant evidence.90 Today, this 
balance is more important than ever, with an individual’s ability to encrypt 
their personal devices constantly improving, and investigative technology 
and surveillance more omnipresent and advanced than ever before.91 Most 
state and federal courts have been able to balance individual privacy inter-
ests and state interests; however, the Florida Second District Court of Ap-
                                                                                                                           
making the passcode testimonial. Id. The defendant refusing to give his passcode to law enforce-
ment during his initial interview constituted the defendant invoking his Fifth Amendment right. Id. 
 88 See id. (finding that because the defendant was linked to the crimes, the hard drives were in 
his possession, and he admitted knowing that the laptops were encrypted, how to decrypt them, 
and that the people he was being accused for committed these crimes with used this type of de-
cryption, it was a foregone conclusion that he had ownership and knowledge of the data inside the 
hard drives and that this data existed in the hard drives). 
 89 Id. Christine Licalzi, Computer Crimes, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1025, 1069 (stating that the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Gelfgatt, as well as other state courts, have found that 
the foregone conclusion applies to forced decryption). 
 90 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976) (determining that when the govern-
ment already knows the location, authenticity, and possession of evidence, compelling a defendant 
to hand over that evidence is no longer considered a testimonial act by the defendant, but an act of 
surrender that does not invoke Fifth Amendment protections); supra notes 64–89 and accompany-
ing text; see also State v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124, 136 (2014) (finding that when a phone has a 
passcode and is registered to a defendant, the State can compel the password to the phone because 
it is a foregone conclusion that the defendant knows that password); Commonwealth v. Baust. 89 
Va. Cir. at 267 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2014) (finding that the only way that a passcode could be deemed a 
foregone conclusion would be if the government already knew the passcode). 
 91 See Apple Announces iOS 8 Available September 17, supra note 5, at 1; Smith, supra note 
3, at 1; Craig Timberg, New Surveillance Technology Can Track Everyone in an Area for Several 
Hours at a Time, WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
technology/new-surveillance-technology-can-track-everyone-in-an-area-for-several-hours-at-a-
time/2014/02/05/82f1556e-876f-11e3-a5bd-844629433ba3_story.html?utm_term=.d40c1424acf6 
[https://perma.cc/7Q5H-8P9D] (stating that law enforcement with new surveillance technology 
can compile second by second images over an area the size of a small city for several hours at a 
time, an ability that law enforcement did not have a few years ago). 
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peals broke this trend in State v. Stahl.92 The appeals court’s extreme inter-
pretation of the doctrine, if adopted by other courts, could effectively end 
the Fifth Amendment protections associated with passcodes and pass-
words.93 
In Stahl v. Stahl, the appeals court found that the State did not need to 
establish possession, authenticity, and location of evidence of voyeurism on 
the defendant’s phone in order in compel him to give the state his 
passcode.94 Instead, the State needed only prove that the cellphone could be 
associated to the defendant for the doctrine to apply.95 If the foregone con-
clusion doctrine were applied according to traditional Supreme Court prec-
edent, the State’s motion to compel the defendant’s passcode based on the 
doctrine would have likely been denied, due to the State’s inability to show 
                                                                                                                           
 92 See Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 124 (finding that the requisite elements of the foregone conclusion 
doctrine are met if the government can prove that a phone belongs to a defendant and that that 
phone cannot be opened without a passcode); supra notes 64–90 and accompanying text. 
 93 See Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 124 (finding that the only thing necessary for a passcode to be a 
foregone conclusion is evidence that the phone belongs to the defendant and evidence that the 
phone requires a passcode to open); Baust, 89 Va. Cir. at 271 (finding that the foregone conclu-
sion doctrine nearly never applies, since the doctrine does not apply unless the government al-
ready knows the passcode to an encrypted device before compelling the defendant to give them 
the passcode). On the other end of the ideological spectrum, the Circuit Court of the City of Vir-
ginia Beach, in Commonwealth v. Baust, found that the only way that evidence could be consid-
ered a foregone conclusion would be if the government already had that evidence. See Baust, 89 
Va. Cir. At 271. In Baust, the defendant was charged with assaulting a woman in his bedroom. Id. at 
267. The victim stated that the defendant maintained a recording device in his home that continuously 
recorded in the room where the assault took place, and that this recording device transmitted footage 
directly to his smartphone. Id. When the officers at the scene asked the defendant and the victim if the 
recording device could have recorded the alleged assault, both affirmed that it is possible that the it 
could have recorded it. Id. at 267–68. With this testimony, the government argued that the actual 
compulsion of the passcode would add little to the government’s information about the case, because 
both the victim and the defendant already affirmed that there was a recording device that transmitted 
footage to the defendant’s smartphone. Id. at 268. The government knew with reasonable particulari-
ty that the recording of the assault was likely on the defendant’s phone, so the passcode was a fore-
gone conclusion. See id. The court, however, denied the government’s motion to compel the defend-
ant`s passcode because it found that the only way that the passcode could be a foregone conclusion 
would be if the Commonwealth already knew the passcode. Id. at 271. This interpretation of the 
foregone conclusion doctrine, if followed by other courts, would constructively eliminate the ability 
of law enforcement to use the foregone conclusion doctrine in data encryption and passcode cases. 
See id. 
 94 See Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 131 (explaining the trial court’s finding that the State was unable to 
prove possession or authenticity of the phone because the State was unable to prove that the phone 
found at the defendant’s residence, a residence that he shares with roommates, was the phone he 
head when he allegedly committed voyeurism); Kletter, supra note 26, at 10 (stating that Fifth 
Amendment protections apply to testimonial evidence unless the location, existence, and authen-
ticity of the evidence is already known). 
 95 See Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 131 (finding that the foregone conclusion requirements would be 
met if the government could prove that the phone belonged to the defendant and required a 
passcode to open). 
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knowledge of possession and location of the phone.96 The State was unable 
to prove the location element of the foregone conclusion doctrine for the 
phone since it could not show that the actual phone that the police found at 
the defendant’s house was the same one he used at the crime scene.97 Addi-
tionally, the government could not prove the possession element of the 
foregone conclusion doctrine because it could not show that the phone be-
longed to the defendant, since it was found in a house where five other in-
dividuals lived.98 Without being able to prove the location and possession 
elements of the foregone conclusion doctrine, the court, in accordance with 
Fisher and its progeny, should have denied the motion to compel the de-
fendant’s passcode.99 
Instead, the court in Stahl reasoned that any electronic device with a 
passcode encryption must have a password associated with the encryption, 
and if the government can provide evidence that the defendant owns that 
electronic device or that the electronic device is registered under the de-
fendant’s name, then it is a foregone conclusion that the government knows 
the phone’s passcode.100 
This reasoning uses the foregone conclusion doctrine to completely in-
validate the key combination distinction made in United States v. Doe.101 A 
                                                                                                                           
 96 See id. at 131, 136 (finding that the government was not required to prove that the evidence 
existed on the phone, but only that the phone belonged to the defendant and required a passcode); 
see also Robert Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoena Law: Taking the Fifth Amendment Seriously, 73 
VA. L. REV. 1, 35–36 (1987) (stating that there are two ways in which courts have applied the 
foregone conclusion doctrine: one that imposes a more rigorous exacting standard that seems to 
follow the Supreme Court precedent in Fisher and Hubble, and one that applies a more lenient 
standard). 
 97 See Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 131, 136 (finding that the government did not have to prove that 
the phone they found at the defendant’s residence was the phone the defendant had at the store, 
but only that the phone belonged to the defendant). 
 98 See id. (finding that it was enough that there were phone carrier records that connected the 
defendant to the phone); Mosteller, supra note 96, at 25 (explaining that possession through an act 
of production implicates the Fifth Amendment when production tends to establish possession of 
the evidence being compelled at an earlier time when a crime was committed, and that in order for 
the government to void this Fifth Amendment protection it must show that it independently can 
prove this link of possession). 
 99 See Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 131, 136 (broadening the scope of the foregone conclusion doctrine 
by only requiring that there was some evidence that connected the defendant to the phone and that 
the phone belonged to the defendant); see also Fisher, 425 U.S. at 412–14 (determining that the 
government needs to prove the location, authenticity, and possession of evidence in order for that 
evidence to fall within the foregone conclusion exception). 
 100 See Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 136; Mosteller, supra note 96, at 8, 25 (stating that when posses-
sion through an act of production implicates the Fifth Amendment, the foregone conclusion should 
only apply when the government has independent evidence of the possession of the evidence, so 
that the production of that evidence adds little to nothing to the government’s case). 
 101 See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 201 n.1 (1988) (determining that a wall safe com-
bination is protected by the Fifth Amendment because it is a product of an individual’s mind); 
Soares, supra note 21, at 2005 (stating that the Supreme Court has distinguished between physical 
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passcode or a combination to a wall safe would no longer have any Fifth 
Amendment protections, even if it was considered testimonial by the court.102 
CONCLUSION 
The Florida Second District Court of Appeals decision in State v. Stahl 
breaks from Supreme Court precedent in both Doe v. United States and 
United States v. Fisher, and could subsequently have devastating results if 
followed by other courts. The foregone conclusion doctrine, which up to 
this point was used as a balancing test, could become an unchecked tool of 
the State to force the compulsion of testimonial evidence that in the past has 
been protected by the Fifth Amendment. In a world where almost every as-
pect of a person’s life is connected to the technology that he or she uses, the 
Stahl court’s interpretation of the foregone conclusion doctrine could lead to 
the circumvention of prior constitutional privacy rights and allow the State 
to have access to almost every aspect of a person’s life by simply getting a 
warrant to search their devices. 
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acts of surrender and acts that force a defendant to divulge the contents of his or her mind, by 
finding that the former does not invoke Fifth Amendment protections while the latter does). 
 102 See Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 136; see Kletter, supra, note 26, at 10 (stating that evidence is a 
foregone conclusion when the location, existence, and authenticity of the evidence is already 
known, so that even if the act of production conveys a fact regarding the existence, location, or 
authenticity of the evidence, that fact is already a foregone conclusion). 
